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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
groups, and to afford them the same privilege where possible.8
Unions have been permitted to strike in order to obtain better wages,9
to force the employer to perform his contracts 10 and to prevent dis-
crimination against union workmen."
As indicated in the principal case, the public policy which lies
behind the Veterans' Act must cause the union contract between the
Sinclair Refining Co. and the Oil Workers International Union to
give way to the discharged soldier. In David v. Boston , M. R. R.,
12
justice Connor, referring to the Act, decided that the veteran was
not to be barred from the right contemplated by the statute because
of a contract between the union and employer. In support of his
contention, he quotes from Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock and Repair
Corp., ". . . no . . . agreements between employers and unions can
cut down the service adjustment benefits which Congress has secured
the veteran under the Act." Is It was also stated that ". . . if the
bargaining agreement clashes with the provisions of the Selective
Service Act, then the former must yield." 14 These and other cases 15
indicate the strength of the public and social policy supporting
the statute. At the present time, when the interest in the returning
veteran has not yet completely disappeared, it is quite apparent that
this policy carries enough weight to offset that which lies behind the
privilege afforded to unions with regard to interference.
W. H. C.
TORTS-RES IPSA LoQUITuR-ExCLUSIVE CoNTROL.-Plaintiff,
while walking on the sidewalk past the defendant's hotel on V-J Day
wvas struck on the head and injured by an armchair which presumably
s Although the full effect of the Taft-Hartley Act is not yet known, there
is some indication that the pendulum has reached the top of its swing and may
be returning the unions a step or two towards the old look. See Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, 1947, 61 STAr. 136, 2 U. S. C. § 251 (Supp. 1947),
29 U. S. C. §§ 141-144, 151-167, 171-182, 185-188, 191-197, 50 U. S. C.
App. § 1509.
9 Roddy v. United Mine Workers of America, 41 Okla. 621, 139 Pac. 126
(1914); Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, Local No. 8,760, 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac.
324 (1909) ; Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated W. L. U. No. 131, 165 Ind.
421, 75 N. E. 877 (1905).
20 Spivak v. Wankofsky, 155 Misc. 530, 278 N. Y. Supp. 562 (Sup. Ct.
1935).
"United Chain Theatres v. Philadelphia M. P. M. 0., 50 F. 2d 189 (E. D.
Pa. 1931); Gill Engraving Co. v. Doerr, 214 Fed. 111 (S. D. N. Y. 1914).
12 71 F. Supp. 342, 347 (D. N. H. 1947).
I '328 U. S. 275, 285, 90 L. ed. 1230, 1240 (1946).
14 Olin Industries v. Barnett, 64 F. Supp. 722, 728 (S. D. Ill. 1946).
1 5 Meehan v. National Supply Co., 160 F. 2d 346 (C. C. A. 11th 1947);
Kay v. General Cable Corporation, 144 F. 2d 653 (C. C. A. 3d 1944) ; Lord
Mfg. Co. v. Nemenz, 65 F. Supp. 711 (W. D. Pa. 1946).
[ VOL. 22
RECENT DECISIONS
came from within the defendant's hotel. The plaintiff relied on the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Held, judgment for defendant, because
the accident was of such a nature that it might have happened despite
the fact that defendant was free from negligence and had used ordin-
ary care, for defendant did not have exclusive control over the in-
strumentality which caused the injury. Larson v. St. Francis Hotel,
et al., - Cal. App. 2d -, 188 P. 2d 513 (1948).
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable when the circum-
stances attendant upon an accident are themselves of such a character
as to justify a jury in inferring negligence as the cause of that acci-
dent.' It can only be invoked where the circumstances of the case
unexplained justify the inference of negligence; 2 as where plaintiff
cannot explain what has happened and defendant, because of its ex-
clusive control and superior knowledge, is presumed to be able to
explain the cause of the accident.3 Res ipsa loquitur, therefore, is
inapplicable unless the plaintiff proves as part of his prima facie case
that the instrumentality causing the injury was under the exclusive
control or management of the defendant; 4 and the doctrine cannot
be relied upon where the accident may have been due to causes over
which defendant had no control.5
The history of the law on this subject is studded with examples
and definitions of just what constitutes the "exclusive control" which
is necessary for the application of the doctrine. It has been held that
the defendant had exclusive control where the plaintiff was injured
in the following ways: in defendant's falling elevator; 6 by the fall
of a bolt from defendant's elevated railroad; 7 by the fall of a vent
pipe installed by the defendant; 8 by the fall of overhead wires being
repaired by the defendant; 9 by plaster falling from the ceiling of
I Benedick v. Potts, 88 Md. 52, 40 Atl. 1067 (1898).2 Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N. Y. 230, 196 N. E. 36 (1935); Hardie v.
Boland Co., 205 N. Y. 336, 98 N. E. 661 (1912).
3 Gerhart v. Southern California Gas Co., 56 Cal. App. 2d 425, 132 P. 2d
874 (1942); Alexander v. Wong Yick, 25 Cal. App. 2d 265, 77 P. 2d 476(1938).
4 Olson v. Witthorne & Swan, 203 Cal. 206, 263 Pac. 518 (1928) ; Brown
v. Board of Trustees, 41 Cal. App. 100, 182 Pac. 316 (1919) ; Massa v. Nippon
Yusen Kaisha, 264 N. Y. 283, 190 N. E. 641 (1934); Slater v. Barnes, 241
N. Y. 284, 149 N. E. 859 (1925) ; Dalzell v. New York, N. H. & H. R. 1L,
136 App. Div. 329, 121 N. Y. Supp. 28 (2d Dep't 1910).
G Hill v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 22 Cal. App. 788, 136 Pac. 492 (1913);
White v. Spreckels, 10 Cal. App. 287, 101 Pac. 920 (1909); Plumb v. Rich-
mond Light & 1. R., 195 App. Div. 254, 187 N. Y. Supp. 38 (2d Dep't 1921),
aff'd, 233 N. Y. 285, 135 N. E. 504 (1922).
6 O'Connor v. Mennie, 169 Cal. 217, 146 Pac. 674 (1915); Griffen v.
Manice, 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925 (1901) ; Kennedy v. McAllaster, 31 App.
Div. 453, 52 N. Y. Supp. 714 (4th Dep't 1898).
7 Volkmar v. Manhattan Ry., 134 N. Y. 418, 31 N. E. 870 (1892).
8 Michener v. Hutton, 203 Cal. 604, 265 Pac. 238 (1928).
9 Harvey v. San Diego Electric Ry., 92 Cal. App. 487, 268 Pac. 468 (1928).
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defendant's vacant apartment; 10 by the collapse of stairs in defen-
dant's stable 1 1 and of a storage tank used in defendant's business; 12
by a feather duster left on the stairs of defendant department store; .1
where plaintiff, a passenger, was injured by the collision of defen-
dant's trolley car,14 or by the parting of a hawser while defendant's
ship was docking; 115 and where plaintiff, a laborer, was hurt by a
falling plank owned by defendant. 16 Generally, the defendant is also
deemed to have exclusive control where plaintiff is injured by falling
parts of his building such as a chimney,' 7 a skylight,' a fire escape
ladder,' 9 a brick,20 or a window sill.21
On the other hand, the courts have held that "exclusive control"
was lacking in the defendant where plaintiff was injured: when she
picked up a broken vase on display in defendant's store; 22 by a
splinter when he slipped and fell while bowling on defendant's
alleys; 23 through failure of defendant landlord to keep a flush handle
in plaintiff's apartment in repair; 24 by the rebound of one swinging
door in defendant's store while she was holding the other door open
for another customer; 25 while riding as a guest in defendant's auto-
mobile when it collided with another car; 26 by a planing machine
which he was operating in a shop class in defendant's school; 27
10 Dittiger v. Isal Realty Corporation, 290 N. Y. 492, 49 N. E. 2d 980
(1943).
11 Storms v. Lane, 223 App. Div. 79, 227 N. Y. Supp. 482 (4th Dep't 1928).
12 Merino v. Pacific Coast Borax Co., 124 Cal. App. 336, 12 P. 2d 458
(1932).
23 Graham v. Joseph H. Bauland Co., 97 App. Div. 141, 89 N. Y. Supp. 595
(2d Dep't 1904)."
14 Plumb v. Richmond Light & R. R., 233 N. Y. 285, 135 N. E. 504 (1922);
Loudoun v. Eighth Avenue R. R., 162 N. Y. 380, 56 N. E. 988 (1900).
15 Soto v. Spring Valley Water Co., 39 Cal. App. 187, 178 Pac. 305 (1918).
16 Cooper v. Quandt, 105 Cal. App. 506, 288 Pac. 79 (1930); Losee v.
Paramount Hotel Corporation, 137 Misc. 530, 242 N. Y. Supp. 608 (Sup. Ct.
1930).
17 Travers v. Murray, 87 App. Div. 552, 84 N. Y. Supp. 558 (2d Dep't
1903).
IsUggla v. Brokaw, 117 App. Div. 586, 102 N. Y. Supp. 857 (1st Dep't
1907).
19 Leonard v. Ireab Holding Corporation, 270 N. Y. 554, 200 N. E. 315(1936).
20 Hughes v. Harbor & Suburban Building & Saving Ass'n, 131 App. Div.
185, 115 N. Y. Supp. 320 (2d Dep't 1909).
21 Papazian v. Baumgartner, 49 Misc. 244, 97 N. Y. Supp. 399 (App. Term
1906).22Guttman v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 159 Misc. 821, 288 N. Y. Supp. 819
(Mun. Ct. 1936).
23 Stelter v. Cordes, 146 App. Div. 300, 130 N. Y. Supp. 688 (2d Dep't
1911).
24 Myers v. Campo Corporation, 26 N. Y. S. 2d 332 (App. Term 1941).
25 Olson v. Whitthorne & Swan, 203 Cal. 206, 263 Pac. 518 (1928).
28Keller v. Cushman, 104 Cal. App. 186, 285 Pac. 399 (1930).
27 Klenzendorf v. Shasta Union H. S. Dist., 4 Cal. App. 2d 164, 40 P. 2d
878 (1935).
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while engaged in apparently dangerous work on defendant's prop-
erty; 28 by the fall of rigging on defendant's ship which was being
used by a stevedore not under the employ of defendant; 29 and by
the fall of a ceiling in an apartment in defendant's building which
was leased to a tenant.3
0
The instant case falls clearly within the second grouping, for
the fact that hotels do not have exclusive control over their furniture
is practically a matter of common knowledge; guests have at least
partial control.
A. P. D.
WILLS-INcoRPoRATION BY REFFNcE.-Testatrix, by a will
executed in New York in May, 1938, bequeathed to five named
distributees "contents of certain envelopes now in my safe deposit
box," containing "securities of various kinds"; said envelopes to bear
the names of her distributees. Held, the bequest is valid as to the
envelopes which were found bearing the names of four such persons.
Matter of Le Collen, 190 Misc. 272, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 467 (Surr. Ct.
1947).
By this decision a New York court has allowed the possible
alteration of the extent of a bequest by a simple variation of the con-
tents of certain envelopes either by the testator or anyone else. In-
deed, one of the bequests seems to have been eliminated altogether
from the will by the fact that no envelope was found to have the
name of one particular person so mentioned in the will.
It is a well-settled rule that if a will duly executed and witnessed
according to statutory requirements incorporates by reference any
document or paper not so executed and witnessed (whether such
paper referred to is in the form of a will, codicil, deed, or a mere
list or schedule or other written paper or document), such paper,
if it was in existence at the time of the execution of the will, and is
identified by clear and satisfactory proof as the paper referred to,
takes effect as a part of the will, and is entitled to probate as such.1
However, the contrary view has been stated to be unquestionably the
law of New York: that an unattested paper which is of a testamentary
nature cannot be taken as a part of a will even though referred to by
that instrument.
2
28 Brown v. Board of Trustees, 41 Cal. App. 100, 182 Pac. 316 (1919).
29 Massa v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 264 N. Y. 283, 190 N. E. 641 (1934).
30 Slater v. Barnes, 241 N. Y. 284, 149 N. E. 859 (1925).
3 Bemis v. Fletcher, 251 Mass. 178, 146 N. E. 277 (1925) ; see also Note,
37 A. L. R. 1476 (1925).
2 Booth v. Baptist Church, 126 N. Y. 215, 28 N. E. 238 (1891) ; Langdon
v. Astor's Exrs., 16 N. Y. 2, 26 (1857) ; Williams v. Freeman, 83 N. Y. 561,
569 (1881); Matter of O'Neil, 91 N. Y. 516, 523 (1883).
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